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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
On appeal, Mr. Cantrell has challenged the district court's denial of his motion to 
suppress the evidence obtained following his DUI arrest, arguing that his rights under 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution were violated when his vehicle 
was searched incident to his arrest. See Arizona v. Ganf, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (April 21, 
2009) (modifying New York v. Belfon, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) and holding that "Police may 
search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a recent occupants arrest 
only if it is reasonable to believe that the arrestee might access the vehicle at the time of 
the search or that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of the arrest.") 
In response, the State argues that: (1) Officer White's search was reasonable 
under Gant because he had reason to believe he would recover evidence relevant to 
the crime of arrest; (2) this Court should overrule State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 
P.2d 660 (1992) and adopt the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule; and (3) 
Mr. Cantrell is foreclosed from challenging the inventory search because it was 
purportedly not raised in the trial court. (See generally, Respondent's Brief). 
The State's arguments fail. An arrest for DUI does not automatically permit an 
officer to search the vehicle incident to arrest absent additional information that 
evidence will probably be found in the vehicle. See United States v. Grote, 629 
F.Supp.2d 1201 (E.D. Wash 2009). Additionally, the State bears the burden to prove 
that the warrantless search in the instant case is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment to United States Constitution. 
With regard to the State's attempt to circumvent Ganf in requesting this Court 
apply the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, pursuant to the retroactivity 
doctrine and the history behind its application, Ganf applies to the instant case and 
requires exclusion of the evidence acquired via the State's illegal search. Alternatively, 
the State has failed to show that Ganf represented a clear break in the law such that the 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule could arguably be applied in this case. 
Moreover, suppression of the fruits of the search in the instant case is necessary to 
enforce the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule as well as vindicate the principles 
under Idaho's exclusionary rule. Finally, the State has failed to offer any basis to show 
that State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992), is manifestly wrong, unjust, 
lacking in wisdom, or that it must be overruled in order to vindicate obvious principles of 
law. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinns 
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously 
articulated in Mr. Cantrell's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply 
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
ISSUE 
Should this Court reverse the district court's order denying Mr. Cantrell's suppression 
motion in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gant where 
Mr. Cantrell's vehicle was searched without a warrant, in violation of his rights under 
Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution? 
ARGUMENT 
This Court Should Reverse The District Court's Order Denving Mr. Cantrell's 
Suppression Motion In Light Of The United States Su~reme Court's Decision In Ganf 
Because Mr. Cantrell's Vehicle Was Searched, Without A Warrant, In Violation Of His 
Rights Under Article I, S 17 Of The ldaho Constitution And The Fourth Amendment To 
The United States Constitution 
A. Introduction 
As is set forth in detail below: (1) an arrest for DUI does not automatically entitle 
an officer to search the vehicle without additional information that evidence of the 
offense of the arrest will be found in the vehicle; (2) the State failed to meet its burden to 
prove that any future inventory search of Mr. Cantrell's vehicle was reasonable; (3) the 
good faith exception is inapplicable in the instant case as "a new rule for conduct of 
criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending 
on direct review or not yet final;" (4) Officer Cullen's reliance on an overly broad reading 
of Belton was unreasonable; and (5) the State has not articulated any reason to justify 
overruling this Court's long standing decision in ~uzman'  that the good faith exception 
to the exclusionary rule does not apply under the ldaho Constitution. 
B. Officer White Did Not Have Probable Cause To Believe That Mr. Cantrell's 
Vehicle Contained Evidence Of The Offense Of The Arrest 
The Ganf Court articulated the search incident to an arrest rule dealing with 
occupants of a vehicle as, "[plolice may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's 
arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at 
the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the 
offense of arrest." 129 S.Ct. at 1723. On appeal, Mr. Cantrell argued that absent 
' State v. Guzman, 122 ldaho 981,842 P.2d 660 (1992). 
4 
additional information that there was contraband or an open container in his vehicle, his 
arrest for suspicion of DUI does not necessarily entitle an officer to search his vehicle 
because the evidence necessary to prove that Mr. Cantrell was operating the vehicle 
under the influence of alcohol is contained within his body, rather than inside the 
vehicle. (Appellant's Brief, pp.14-15.) 
In response, the State essentially is asking this Court to adopt a per se rule, that 
where a driver is arrested on suspicion of DUI, the officer is entitled to search his 
vehicle incident to arrest, without any consideration of the facts and circumstances of 
the individual case. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.5-7.) The State's position is contrary 
to the plain language of Ganf and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in general. Gant 
permits officers to search a vehicle incident to arrest where "it is reasonable to believe 
the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest." 129 S.Ct. at 1723 (emphasis 
added). Thus, the question is whether or not the search is "reasonable," under the 
totality of circumstances, which of course is the traditional test for a warrantless search 
under the Fourth Amendment. See Kafz v. Unifed States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
Mr. Cantrell asserts that this Court should hold that the "reasonable to believe" 
standard equates to the probable cause standard. See United Sfates v. Gorman, 314 
F.3d 1105 (gth Cir. 2002); United States v. Grote, 629 F.Supp.2d 1201 (E.D. Wash 
2009). In Gorman, the Ninth Circuit was left to define the "reason to believe" standard, 
which is used to determine when an officer can enter a residence in search of a person 
for whom they have an arrest warrant. Gorman, 314 F.3d at 11 10-1 11 1. The Gorman 
Court concluded that the "reason to believe" standard "embodies the same standard of 
reasonableness inherent in probable cause." Id. at 11 11-1 11 3. More recently, in 
attempting to define the "reasonable to believe" standard articulated in Ganf, the Grote 
Court relied on the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Gorman and held that the Gant 
"reasonable to believe" standard equates to the traditional probable cause standard. 
Grote, 329 F.Supp.2d at 1203. Accordingly, Mr. Cantrell asserts that this is the 
appropriate definition of the "reasonable to believe" standard for this Court to apply. 
The question now becomes whether Officer White had probable cause to believe 
that he would locate evidence of the offense of arrest upon searching Mr. Cantrell's 
vehicle following his arrest for suspicion of DUI. This issue was recently addressed in 
Grofe, supra. In Grofe, the defendant was stopped for suspicion of DUI and while 
Officer Greenland spoke with him, Officer Moses observed a brown paper bag wrapped 
around a bottle located next to Grote. Id. 329 F.Supp.2d at 1204. Officer Moses 
testified that the brown bag was consistent with the type of bags liquor stores typically 
use. Id. The officers left Grote's presence to confer about the case, and upon returning 
to the vehicle, observed that the brown paper bag had been moved from the passenger 
seat into the back cab area. Id. Grote was arrested for suspicion of DUI and his vehicle 
was searched incident to arrest after Grote was handcuffed and placed in the back of 
the police cruiser. Id. Officers found an unopened bottle of vodka, as well as a loaded 
handgun and blasting caps. Id. 
On appeal, the Grote Court was required to determine whether police can search 
a vehicle incident to a DUI arrest. The Court indicated that it was hesitant to hold that 
an officer can never search a vehicle incident to a DUI arrest and equally as "hesitant to 
hold that a lawful arrest for DUI will always justify a search of a vehicle incident to arrest 
on the assumption it will always be reasonable to believe that evidence of a DUI will be 
found in the vehicle" as "resolution of this particular case . . . does not turn on 
application of any per se rule." Id. Instead, the Court analyzed the totality of the 
circumstances and information available to the officers in holding that Grote's physical 
condition (suspected intoxication) in conjunction with "there appearing to be a bottle of 
alcohol inside a brown paper bag located next" to Grote, "it would have been 
reasonable for an officer to believe that evidence of DUI 'might' be found in the vehicle." 
Id. at 1205. 
Unlike in Grofe, other than his own subjective belief, Officer White possessed no 
objective information that evidence related to the crime of DUI "might" be found in the 
vehicle. Rather, there is no evidence that Officer White observed anything inside the 
vehicle that would give him cause to believe he would find additional evidence and 
Officer White even acknowledged that he did not "smell any odor of an alcoholic 
beverage." (Tr., p.73, Ls.11-16.) Moreover, because all of the evidence needed to 
prosecute Mr. Cantrell is contained within his body, and under the current law of the 
State of Idaho, there is no need for any further evidence gathering on the part of Officer 
White. See Stafe v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 160 P.3d 739 (2007). 
Accordingly, it was not reasonable for Officer White to search Mr. Cantrell's 
vehicle incident to arrest to purportedly obtain evidence of the offense of arrest. 
C. The State Has The Burden To Prove That The Warrantless "lnventorv" Search Of 
Mr. Cantrell's Vehicle Was Reasonable 
In its briefing, the State argues that "whether the inventory policy addressed 
opening containers was an issue never raised to the trial court" and as a result 
"Cantrell's improper attempt to raise it on appeal should be rejected." (Respondent's 
Brief, p.24.) The State is incorrect as the issue was before the trial court, and in 
addition, its argument portrays a fundamental misunderstanding of its burden to justify a 
warrantless search, or in the alternative, is an improper attempt to shift the burden of 
proof to Mr. Cantrell. 
Prior to the evidentiary hearing, the State conceded that the search in the instant 
case was conducted without a warrant and, therefore, it was the State's burden to 
demonstrate an exception to the warrant requirement applied. (Tr., p.14, Ls.14-23.) In 
fact, in its brief, the State first acknowledged that "Under the inevitable discovery 
doctrine evidence may be admissible, notwithstanding the government's illegality in 
searching for or seizing the evidence, where the state can show that the eventual 
discovery of the evidence was inevitable." (R., p.62 (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 
(1984) (emphasis added).) Next, the State argued that in the instant case, "the police 
would have utilized certain proper and predictable investigatory procedures; and such 
procedures would have inevitably led to the discovery of the evidence." (R., p.62.) In 
response, trial counsel argued that the potential inventory search and inevitable 
discovery doctrine were inapplicable to the instant case. (Tr., p.98, L.17 - p.104, L.1.) 
However, as is argued in Mr. Cantrell's Appellant's Brief, the State failed to meet its 
burden to make any showing that the Boise Police Department had a standard 
procedure for conducting an inventory search prior to impounding the vehicle or would 
have followed a standard policy for conducting inventory searches on the vehicles it 
impounds. See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1,4 (1990); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 
U.S. 364, 368-369 (1 976). 
Moreover, even if trial counsel's broad challenge to the inevitable discovery 
doctrine and inventory search below were not sufficient, Mr. Cantrell can challenge the 
State's failure to meet its burden for the first time on appeal. See State v. Hanson, 142 
71 1, 132 P.3d 468 (Ct. App. 2006). In Hanson, one of the questions before the court 
was whether Hanson had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle illegally 
searched by officers, which was raised for the first time on appeal by the State. Id. at 
717, 132 P.3d at 474. Hanson argued that the State was foreclosed to argue whether 
he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. Id. The Hanson Court found 
that because the burden to prove an expectation of privacy in the thing or place 
searched is on the defendant and the "State has no responsibility to go foward with 
evidence" on that issue, the State may challenge a defendant's "standing" for the first 
time on appeal. Id. at 718, 132 P.3d at 475. Here, where it is the State's burden to 
offer evidence that the Boise Police Department had a standard procedure for 
conducting inventory search prior to impounding the vehicle or would have followed a 
standard policy for conducting inventory searches on the vehicles it impounds, and 
Mr. Cantrell has no responsibility to offer evidence to prove the State's purported 
exception, Mr. Cantrell can challenge the State's failure to meet its burden for the first 
time on appeal. Accordingly, the State's argument is without merit. 
D. This Court Should Reverse The District Court's Order Denyinq Mr. Cantrell's 
Su~pression Motion In Liqht Of The United States Supreme Court's Decision In 
Gant Because Mr. Cantrell's Vehicle Was Searched, Without A Warrant. In 
Violation Of His Riqhts Under Article I, 5 17 Of The Idaho Constitution And The 
Fourth Amendment To The United States Constitution 
In its briefing, the State asks this Court to circumvent the United States Supreme 
Court's recent decision in Gant, and hold that the arresting officer's unconstitutional 
conduct was permissible under the "'good faith' exception to the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule." (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-18.) The State argues that the "good 
faith" exception, as first articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Leon, applies because 
the primary purpose for the exclusionary rule is to deter overzealous law enforcement, 
this Court should find that Officer White was acting in good faith. (Respondent's Brief, 
pp.7-18.) In so arguing, without any in depth analysis of Gant or Belton, the State 
surmises that Officer White was acting in an objectively reasonable manner because he 
was acting based on his belief, albeit mistaken, that was permitted to search 
Mr. Cantrell's vehicle. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-11.) 
Next, the State argues that the "search in this case was legal under the ldaho 
Constitution as it has been interpreted by its courts" and if "this Court should, in this 
case or another pending case, adopt the analysis as controlling under Idaho's 
constitution" then "the search was still reasonable because it is reasonable to search a 
DUI arrestee's car for evidence of DUI."' (Respondent's Brief pp.11-12.) As is set forth 
in detail below, the State's claims are without any merit. 
' Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause (U.S. Const. Art. VI), it would be impermissible for 
this Court to interpret Art. I, 9 17 as providing less constitutional protection than 
provided by the federal constitution, where Mr. Cantrell has raised both a federal and 
state constitutional violation. See generally McCullock v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
Moreover, this Court has previously held that Art. I, § 17 of the ldaho Constitution "is to 
be construed consistently with the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution," 
except that "state courts are at liberty to find within the provisions of their own 
constitutions greater protection than is afforded under the federal constitution as 
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court." Stafe v. Thompson, 114 ldaho 746, 
748, 760 P.2d 1162, 1164 (1988); see also Fetterly v. State, 121 ldaho 417, 422, 825 
P.2d 1073, 1078 (1992) (Bistline dissenting) (recognizing that "To the extent that Griffith 
is used to ensure a minimum level of constitutional protection, it appears this Court is 
bound by the Supremacy Clause (U.S. Const. Art. VI) to apply the rule in cases on 
direct review."); Pizzuto v. State, 146 ldaho 720, 728, 202 P.3d 642, 650 (2008) 
(recognizing that "Because of the Supremacy Clause, ldaho Code 3 19-2719(5)(c) 
However, before addressing the State's new claims, it is important to properly 
analyze the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Ganf, the pendency of which the 
instant case was stayed and ultimately accepted for review by this Court. In Gant, the 
United States Supreme Court had the opportunity to reassess its decision in Belfon and 
the broad interpretation various courts had given what they believed to be the "Belton 
rule." In Gant, the defendant was arrested for driving on a suspended license. Id. 129 
S.Ct. at 1715. Gant was handcuffed and locked in a police cruiser while officers 
searched his vehicle, locating a gun and a bag of cocaine in the pocket of a jacket in the 
backseat. Id. 
As in every search case, the Court began its analysis "addressing the 
reasonableness of a warrantless search, with the basic rule that 'searches conducted 
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."' Id. at 1716 (citing Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). The Court then reiterated its holding in  hime el,^ the 
precursor to Belton, that searches incident to arrest are reasonable "'in order to remove 
any weapons [the arrestee] might seek to use' and 'in order to prevent [the] 
concealment or destruction' of evidence." Id. (citations omitted). The Court recognized, 
however, '[ilf there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that the 
officers seek to search, both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception are 
absent and the rule does not apply." Id. (citing Preston v. United Sfafes, 376 U.S. 364, 
367-368 (1 964)). 
cannot prevent the Afkins [v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)l opinion from being applied 
retroactively in this case.") 
Chime1 v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
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Next, the Ganf Court analyzed the specific factual scenario presented in Belton, 
where a lone police officer had stopped four occupants of a vehicle and observed 
evidence of controlled substance possession and use. Id. at 1716-1717. The Court 
observed that the lone officer, having probable cause to believe the suspects committed 
a drug offense, ordered them out of the vehicle and placed them under arrest, without 
handcuffing them or placing them in the police cruiser, and then searched the vehicle. 
Id. at 1717. Observing that there was never a suggestion by any of the parties in Belton 
that Chime1 authorized a vehicle search where the arrestees did not have any possibility 
to access the vehicle, the Belfon Court held that when an officer arrests "the occupant 
of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the 
passenger compartment of the automobile." Id. (citing Belton at 460). Interpreting 
Belfon, the Arizona Supreme Court found that the Belfon decision merely delineated 
"'the proper scope of a search of the interior of an automobile' incident to arrest, . . . 
when the passenger compartment is within the arrestees reaching distance, Belfon 
supplies the generalization that the entire compartment and any containers therein may 
be reached." Id. at 171 7-1 71 8 (citing Belfon at 459). 
The Ganf Court recognized that "[dlespife the textual and evidentjaty support for 
the Arizona Supreme Court's reading of Belfon, our opinion has been widely understood 
to allow a vehicle search incident to arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no 
possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search." Id. at 
1718 (emphasis added). The Court acknowledged that this broad reading "may be 
attributable to Justice Brennan's dissent" rather than the language of the opinion. Id. 
Citing to Justice O'Conner's opinion in Thornfon v. Unifed Stafes, 541 U.S. 615, 620, 
631 (2004), the Gant Court found it troubling that "'lower court decisions seem to now 
treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a police 
entitlement rather than as an exception justified by the twin rationales of Chimel."' Id. at 
1718 (quoting Thornton, 541 U.S. at 624 (Justice O'Conner concurring in part)). The 
Gant Court rejected such a broad reading of Belton which would "untether the rule from 
the justifications underlying the Chimel exception - a result clearly incompatible with our 
statement in Belton that it 'in no way alters the fundamental principles established in the 
Chimel case regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests."' 
Id (emphasis added). 
The Court then rejected the dissent's claim that "consideration of police reliance 
interests require" adherence to a broad reading of Belton, stating: 
Although it appears that the State's reading of Belton has been widely 
taught in police academies and that law enforcement officers have relied 
on the rule in conducting vehicle searches during the past 28 years, many 
of these searches were not justified by the reasons underlying the Chimel 
exception. Countless individuals guilty of nothing more serious than a 
traffic violation have had their constitutional right to the security of their 
private effects violated as a result. The fact that the law enforcement 
community may view the State's version of the Belton rule as an 
entitlement does not establish the sort of reliance interest that could 
outweigh the countervailing interest that ail individuals share in having 
their constitutional rights fully protected. If it is clear that a practice is 
unlawful, individuals' interest in its discontinuance clearly outweighs any 
law enforcement "entitlement" to its persistence. 
Id. at 1722-1723 (footnote omitted). The Gant Court, however, expressly refused to 
overrule Belfon as other courts' "broad reading of that decision is unfounded." Id. at 
1723 (emphasis added). 
The Gant Court articulated the search incident to an arrest rule dealing with 
occupants of a vehicle as, "[plolice may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's 
arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at 
the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the 
offense of arrest." Id. at 1723. 
E. The Retroactivity Doctrine Requires That This Court APP~V Gant To Officer 
White's Unconstitutional Search Of Mr. Cantrell's Vehicle And APP~V The 
Exclusionary Rule In Reversinq The District Court's Order Denyina Mr. Cantrell's 
Sup~ression Motion 
In its briefing, the State has argued that the good faith exception precludes 
suppression of the evidence obtained in violation of Mr. Cantrell's rights under the 
Fourth Amendment. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-11.) The State's assertion is without 
merit as the history of the retroactivity doctrine makes it clear, the "good faith exception" 
is inapplicable in this case and all cases wherein an officer conducts an unconstitutional 
warrantless search based on an erroneous reliance and reading of applicable case 
law.4 See generally Grifith v. United Sfafes, 479 U.S. 314 (1987); United States v. 
Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982). 
In Johnson, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether Payton v. New ~ o r k , ~  
which prohibited police from making a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a 
suspect's home to make a felony arrest, should be applied retroactively to cases not yet 
final when the decision was rendered. Id. 457 U.S. at 537-539. The Johnson Court 
adopted the following analysis. The Court first determines whether it "has expressly 
declared a rule of criminal procedure to be a 'clear break' with the past," such that the 
As is set forth in detail below, even if the "good faith exception" is applicable to the 
instant situation, it is inapplicable under Art. I, 3 17 of the ldaho Constitution and the 
State has failed to offer any cogent reason to overrule State v. Guzman, 122 ldaho 981, 
842 P.2d 660 (1992). 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 
Court has announced an "entirely new and unanticipated principle of law." Id. at 549- 
551 (citing Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248 (1969)). A clear break within the 
law occurs "only when a decision explicitly overrules a past precedent of this Court . . . 
or disapproves a practice this Court arguably has sanctioned in prior cases . . . or 
overturns a longstanding and widespread practice to which this Court has not spoken, 
but which a near-unanimous body of lower court authority expressly approved." Id. at 
551 (internal citations omitted). Where the Court finds an unanticipated "new rule" has 
been created, to determine its retroactivity, the Court is to look to "(a) the purpose to be 
sewed by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement 
authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a 
retroactive application of the new standards." Id. at 544 (citing Stovall v. Denno, 388 
U.S. 293 (1967)). However, where a decision construing the Fourth Amendment is not 
a "clear break from the past" it is applied retroactively to all cases not yet final when the 
decision is handed down. Id, at 562; see also Solem v, Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 641, fn.3 
(1984). 
The Johnson Court explained its rationale for applying Payfon retroactively to all 
cases not yet final. First, "'[r]efusal to apply new constitutional rules to all cases arising 
on direct review . . . tends to cut this Court loose from the force of precedent, allowing 
us to restructure artificially those expectations legitimately created by extant law and 
thereby mitigate the practical force of stare decisis . . . a force which ought properly to 
bear on the judicial resolution of any legal problem."' Id. at 554-556 (quoting Mackey v. 
United States, 401 U.S. 667, 680-681 (1971)). Next, the retroactive application of 
Payfon to cases on direct review would "do justice to each litigant on the merits of his 
own case" and "resolve all cases before us on direct review in light of our best 
understanding of governing constitutional principles." Id. at 555 (citing Desisf at 259; 
Mackey at 679). The Court observed that "[ilf a 'new' constitutional doctrine is truly 
right, we should not reverse lower courts which have accepted it; nor should we affirm 
those which have rejected the very arguments we have embraced." Id. (citing Desist at 
259). Finally, retroactive application furthers the goal of treating similarly situated 
defendants similarly. Id. The Court continued, "it goes without saying that Theodore 
Payton also was arrested before Payfon was decided, and he received the benefit of the 
rule in his case." Id. "An approach that resolved all nonfinal convictions under the 
same rule of law would lessen the possibility that this Court might mete out different 
constitutional protection to defendants simultaneously subjected to identical police 
conduct." Id. 
The Johnson majority also addressed the concerns against the adoption of this 
retroactivity doctrine. The government in Johnson argued that if the purpose of the 
exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, the evidence should only be suppressed 
if the "law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may be properly charged with 
knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment." Id. 
(citing Unifed Sfafes v. Pelfier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975)). In other words, the 
government argued that "new Fourth Amendment rules must be denied retroactive 
effect in all cases except those in which law enforcement officers failed to act in good- 
faith compliance with then-prevailing constitutional norms," and under an objective test, 
law enforcement officers can only be charged with knowledge of all "settled" Fourth 
Amendment law. Id. The Court quickly dispelled this argument, stating: 
Under this view, the only Fourth Amendment rulings worthy of retroactive 
application are those in which the arresting officers violated pre-existing 
guidelines clearly established by prior cases. But as we have seen above, 
cases involving simple application of clear, pre-existing Fourth 
Amendment guidelines raise no real questions of retroactivity at all. 
Literally read, the Government's theory would automatically eliminate all 
Fourth Amendment rulings from consideration for retroactive application. 
Id. at 560. Next, the government claimed that retroactive effect of Payton would not 
serve the policies under the exclusionary rule and would have little deterrent effect 
"because law enforcement officers would rarely be deterred from engaging in a practice 
they never expected to be invalidated." Id. The Court observed that it cannot rule on 
every unsettled question under the Fourth Amendment and years may pass before it 
finally "invalidates a police practice of dubious constitutionality." Id. Moreover, if "all 
rulings resolving unsettled Fourth Amendment questions should be nonretroactive, then, 
in close cases, law enforcement officials would have litfle incentive to err on the side of 
constitutional behavior." Id. at 56l(emphasis added). This would "encourage police or 
other courts to disregard the plain purport of our decisions and to adopt a let's-wait-until- 
it's-decided approach." Id (citing Desist at 277). Based on the foregoing rationales, the 
Johnson Court found that Payton applied retroactive to all cases not yet final. 
Then, in 1987, three years after the United States Supreme Court announced the 
good faith doctrine in Leon, the Court again revisited the retroactivity doctrine in 
Griffifh v. United States, 479 U.S. 314 (1987). In GrifXth, the Court was concerned with 
the potential retroactivity of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).~ In Griffith, the 
Court recognized the previous three prong test for retroactivity as well as the new test 
In Bafson, the Court held that a criminal defendant could establish a prima facie case 
of racial discrimination violative of the Fourteenth Amendment based on a prosecutor's 
articulated in Johnson for dealing with Fourth Amendment cases. Id. 479 U.S. at 321- 
322. Relying heavily on the Johnson Court's analysis, which had embraced Justice 
Harlan's rationale in ~esisf '  and ~ a c k e y , ~  the Court held, "a new rule for the conduct of 
criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases . . . not yet final, with no 
exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the past." Id. 
at 328. In doing so, the Court observed, "[tjhe fact that a new rule may constitute a 
clear break with the past has no bearing on the 'actual inequity that results' when only 
one of many similarly situated defendants receives the benefit of the new rule." Id. at 
327-328. The Court acknowledged that it would be impossible to hear every case 
pending on direct review and apply the rule to each case, but would "fulfill our judicial 
responsibility by instructing the lower courts to apply the new rule retroactively to cases 
not yet final." Id. at 323. 
It is readily apparent that the post-Leon decision in Griffith, which adopted the 
analysis of Johnson that implicitly included the court's discussion of the exclusionary 
rule and deterrence, effectively removed the application of the good faith doctrine to 
cases pending on direct review when a decision interpreting the Constitution is rendered 
by this land's highest court. Just as the officers in Ganf were operating under an overly 
broad and "unfounded" interpretation of Belfon, so was Officer Cullen in the instant 
case. The "integrity of judicial review" requires that all similarly situated defendants be 
treated the same. Here, where Mr. Cantrell's rights were violated by unconstitutional 
use of peremptory challenges to strike members of a defendant's race from a jury 
venire. Id. at 96-98. 
' Desisf V. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969). 
Mackey v. United Sfafes, 401 U.S. 667 (1971). 
conduct by law enforcement, he is entitled to the same remedy as Gant, suppression of 
the fruits of the unlawful acts. 
This precise issue was recently addressed by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. 
Gonzalez, 2009 W.L. 2581738 (gth Cir. Aug. 24, 2009). In Gonzalez, the government 
conceded that Gant applied, but argued "nonetheless that the search was in good faith 
under the then-prevailing interpretation of Belton and that, therefore, the exclusionary 
rule should not be applied." Id. - F.3d at -. The Gonzalez Court first observed 
that neither the United States Supreme Court, nor the Ninth Circuit had ever applied the 
good faith exception to the instant situation. Id. Citing to Griffith and Johnson, supra, 
the Court stated, "To hold that Gant may not be fully applied here, as the Government 
urges, would conflict with the Court's retroactivity precedents." Id. (emphasis added). 
The Court concluded, "Because both Johnson and Griffith remain binding precedent, we 
cannot apply the good faith exception here without creating an untenable tension within 
existing Supreme Court law." Id. 
In United States v. Buford, - F.Supp.2d -, 2009WL1635780(M.D.Tenn. 
2009), the Buford Court reached a similar result. There, balancing the government's 
argument that the good faith doctrine should be applied to save the unconstitutional 
search with the application of Griffith, the Court found in favor of suppressing the fruits 
of the impermissible Belfon search. Id - F.Supp.2d at ; but see United 
States v. Grote 2009 WL 2068023 (E.D. Wash. 2009) (recognizing the conflict between 
Gant and the good faith doctrine in applying the good faith exception to the search). 
The Court stated: 
such an extension of the "good faith exception would lead to perverse 
results. For instance, under the Government's argument, there is no basis 
for distinguishing the petitioner in the "new rule" case from similarly 
situated defendants whose cases were proceeding when the new rule was 
announced. That is, from the Government's view of the "good faith 
exception, there is no distinction between Gant and the defendant here, 
because both arresting officers were operating in a Belton world. Under 
the Government's argument, then, Gant himself would only be entitled to 
the rather hollow relief of knowing that the search he was subjected to was 
a violation of his constitutional rights; that is, he would not be entitled to 
suppression of the evidence because the evidence was obtained in a 
good faith reliance on Belton. Anyone similarly situated to Gant (such as 
the defendant) who was unfortunate enough to be arrested pre-Gant 
would likewise receive the same hollow relief. Anyone similarly situated to 
Gant, however, who was arrested subsequent to the Ganf decision would 
be entitled to suppression of the evidence because the Gant decision 
would eliminate the good faith argument. Therefore, the individual (Gant) 
who successfully convinced the Court that his Fourth Amendment rights 
had been violated would run the risk of criminal penalty, while subsequent 
defendants might go free, despite being subject to identical intrusions on 
privacy. Indeed, discussing a defendant similarly situated to the one in this 
case, one court noted, "[tlo say that an exception exists under the Leon 
rule to the application of [a] United States Supreme Court[ ] holding ... 
which would permit the principle of the [ ] holding to be ignored [in a case 
subsequent to the holding] ... to Defendant's prejudice, creates logical and 
rationalogical anomalies in implementation of Fourth Amendment doctrine 
of a decidedly perverse effect." U.S. v. Holmes, 175 F.Supp.2d 62 n. 6 
(D.Me.2001) (noting the conundrum but not resolving the issue). 
Id. - F.Supp.2d at -. 
Accordingly, as articulated herein, this Court should apply the retroactivity 
doctrine and reverse the district court's order denying Mr. Cantrell's suppression motion. 
F. The Leon "Good Faith Exception To The Exclusionarv Rule Has No Application 
In The Instant Case 
In its brief on review, relying primarily on Leon, the State argues that the good 
faith exception precludes suppression of the evidence under the Fourth Amendment. 
(Respondent's Brief On Review, pp.7-11.) In 1984, the United States Supreme Court 
addressed the application of the exclusionary rule to a case where a state superior 
judge had issued a facially valid warrant that was later executed by officers, but found to 
be invalid because the affidavit in support of the warrant was insufficient to establish 
probable cause. Leon, 468 U.S. at 902-904. 
The question before the Leon Court was whether the exclusionary rule should be 
applied to suppress evidence obtained when an officer, acting in objective good faith, 
reasonably relied on a facially valid warrant that was not supported by sufficient 
probable cause. Id. In adopting a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, the 
Court held that "the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppression of 
evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated 
search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion." Id. at 922. The Court 
relied on the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule and that the officers where 
acting in objective good faith on a facially valid warrant. Id. at 918-922. The Leon Court 
observed that the deterrent effect, which is meant to alter the behavior of individual law 
enforcement officers or the policies of their department, would have limited effect in the 
case where the error was on the part of a judge, rather than officer in executing the 
warrant. Id. 
In the years following Leon, the U.S. Supreme Court has applied the good faith 
exception based on an officer's reliance on an error committed by a third party. See 
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984) (police reasonably relied on 
magistrate's issuance of a warrant); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (police 
reasonably relied on a statute's constitutionality); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995) 
(police reasonably relied on record keeping error by a court clerk); and Herring v. United 
Sfafes, 129 S.Ct. 695 (2009) (officer's reliance on a negligent record keeping error 
attenuated from the search). However, the Court has never previously stated, or hinted, 
that a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule can be applied where an officer 
relies on the incorrect interpretation of then existing case law. 
1. as sum in^ Arcruendo, That This Court Concludes The Retroactivity 
Doctrine Does Not Mandate Application Of The Exclusionarv Rule In This 
Case. The Gant Decision Is Not A "Clear Break In The Law And Was 
Foreshadowed By Earlier Cases 
The United States Supreme Court has never applied the good faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule to determine whether suppression is appropriate when an officer 
was acting under an incorrect interpretation of the case law, so the standard it would 
employ is unknown. In the event the court were to apply the good faith exception to the 
instant situation, the history of the retroactivity doctrine suggests that the Court would 
look to determine whether the recent decision represents a clear break from then 
existing law or was foreshadowed by earlier cases. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 912-913, fn. 
10; Solem, 465 U.S. at 645-647; Johnson, 457 U.S. 549-554. 
Prior to Grifith, which made all new Fourth Amendment cases retroactive to those 
cases not yet final, in determining whether the new decision of the Supreme Court 
would be retroactively applied, the Court looked to whether the decision was 
foreshadowed by earlier cases or was a "clear break with the past." Solem, 465 U.S. at 
645-647; Johnson, 457 U.S. 549-554. A clear break within the law occurs "only when a 
decision explicitly overrules a past precedent of this Court . . . or disapproves a practice 
this Court arguably has sanctioned in prior cases . . . or overturns a longstanding and 
widespread practice to which this Court has not spoken, but which a near-unanimous 
body of lower court authority expressly approved." Johnson, 457 U.S. at 551 (internal 
citations omitted) (emphasis added). Based on a review of the case law in existence at 
the time the illegal search in this case (November 9, 2005) as well as the Supreme 
Court's Opinion in Gant, it is readily apparent that Gant was not a clear break from 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
a. Gant Does Not Explicitly Overrule Belton Or Disa~orove Of A Practice It 
Had Arquablv Sanctioned In Prior Cases 
A court first looks to whether the new case "explicitly overrules" past precedent of 
the Supreme Court or disapproves of a practice it had "arguably sanctioned in prior 
cases." Johnson, 457 U.S. at 551. The Gant Court expressly stated that it was not 
overruling Belton, the case purportedly relied on by the State to sanction the search in 
this case. Gant, 129 S.Ct. Id. at 1723. Rather, it found that the overly broad reading 
other courts had attributed to the Belton decision was "unfounded." Id. In fact, the 
Court criticized any reading of Belfon authorizing search incident to every recent 
occupant's arrest as "untether[ing] the rule from the justifications underlying the Chimel 
exceptions - a result clearly incompatible with our statement in Belton that it 'in no way 
alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding the basic 
scope of search incident to lawful custody arrest."' Id. at 1719 (emphasis added). 
In addition to the plain language from Belton, analyzing the case under Chimel 
and adopting it twin rationales, in 2004, the United States Supreme Court spoke to a 
Belton related situation in Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004). In Thornton, 
an officer pulled over Thornton because the tags on his vehicle did not match the car he 
was driving. Id. 541 U.S. at 618. During a pat down, Thornton conceded that he was in 
possession of illegal narcotics, and the officer discovered marijuana and crack cocaine. 
Id. After Thornton was handcuffed and placed in the back of the patrol car, the officer 
searched Thornton's vehicle and found a 9-millimeter handgun. Id. 
The Thornton Court concluded that the search was permissible pursuant to 
Belton. Id. at 616. Justice Rehnquist authored the opinion, except as to footnote 4,' 
and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer joined the opinion in full. Id. Justice 
O'Conner joined the opinion, with the exception of footnote 4, and filed an opinion 
concurring in part. Id. Justice Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment, 
which was joined by Justice Ginsburg. Id, Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, 
which was joined by Justice Souter. Id. 
In Justice O'Conner's concurring opinion, she wrote, "I write separately to 
express my dissatisfaction with the state of the law in this area." Id. at 624. Justice 
' Footnote 4 provides: 
Whatever the merits of Justice SCALIA's opinion concurring in the 
judgment, this is the wrong case in which to address them. Petitioner has 
never argued that Belton should be limited 'Yo cases where it is 
reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be 
found in the vehicle," post, at 2137-38, nor did any court below consider 
Justice SCALIA's reasoning. See Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. 
Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206,212-213, 118 S. Ct. 1952,141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998) 
( " 'Where issues are neither raised before nor considered by the Court of 
Appeals, this Court will not ordinarily consider them' " (quoting Adickes v. 
S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 147, n. 2, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 
(1970))). The question presented-"[wlhether the bright-line rule announced 
in New York v. Belton is confined to situations in which the police initiate 
contact with the occupant of a vehicle while that person is in the vehicle," 
Pet. for Cert.-does not fairly encompass Justice SCALIA's analysis. See 
this Court's Rule 14.l(a) ("Only the questions set out in the petition, or 
fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court"). And the United 
States has never had an opportunity to respond to such an approach. See 
Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 536, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 118 L.Ed.2d 153 
(1992). Under these circumstances, it would be imprudent to overrule, for 
all intents and purposes, our established constitutional precedent, which 
governs police authority in a common occurrence such as automobile 
searches pursuant to arrest, and we decline to do so at this time. 
O'Conner recognized the problem with Belfon's "shaky foundation" and that "lower court 
decisions seem now to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a 
recent occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an exception." Id. at 624-625. 
However, Justice O'Conner refused to adopt Justice Scalia's approach because "neither 
the Government nor the petitioner has had a chance to speak to its merit." Id. at 625. 
Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Ginsburg, 
forcibly expressed his displeasure with Belfon. Id. at 625-632. Justice Scalia first 
recognized that which is obvious to any rational person that when Thornton's car was 
searched, he was neither in nor near the passenger compartment of his vehicle, but 
was handcuffed and secured in the officer's patrol car. Id. at 625. He continued, "The 
risk that a suspect handcuffed in the back of a squad car might escape and recover a 
weapon from his vehicle is surely no greater than the risk that a suspect handcuffed in 
his residence might escape and recover a weapon from the next room," a danger 
rejected in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Id. at 627. Justice Scalia 
---concluded-thatthe B d ~ - v ~ i l e s f f ~ c i b ~  to arrest rule should be limited "to 
cases where it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be 
found in the vehicle." Id. at 631. 
As the Ganf Court recognized, Thornfon is consistent with both Chimel and 
Belfon. Ganf, 129 S.Ct. at 1722. Whereas in Belfon, it was possible for the occupants 
to access the passenger compartment of the vehicle, thus justifying the search, in 
Thornfon it was impossible for the occupant to access the passenger compartment, but 
the officer had discovered illegal substances thereby justifying the search of the 
passenger compartment to discover evidence of the arresting offense. See Belfon, 453 
U.S. 455-458; Thornton, 541 U.S. at 618. The ultimate decision in Gant was merely 
derived from a logical reading of Chimel, Belton, and Thornton together, as the Arizona 
Supreme Court ascertained and scribed in its opinion in Arizona v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640 
(Ariz. 2007). Moreover, the Gant Court expressed its displeasure with the continued 
broad reading of Belton in light of its Thornton decision, stating in a footnote, "The 
practice of searching vehicles incident to arrest after the arrestee has been handcuffed 
and secured in a patrol car has not abated since we decided Thornton. Gant, 129 S.Ct. 
at 1719 fn.3. Accordingly, it cannot be said that Belton was overruled by Gant or that 
Gant disapproves of a practice it had "arguably sanctioned in prior cases." 
b. Gant Does Not Overturn A Lon~standinq And Widespread Practice To 
Which This Court Has Not Spoken, But Which A Near-Unanimous Body 
Of Lower Court Authoritv Expresslv Approved 
The next factor in determining whether a new decision should be uniformly 
applied to all cases pending on direct review, is whether the new decision "overturns a 
longstanding and widespread practice to which this Court has not spoken, but which a 
near-unanimous body of lower court authority expressly approved." Johnson, 457 U.S. 
at 551 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). First of all, the U.S. Supreme Court has, 
at the very least, implicitly spoken to the issue based on a logical reading of Chimel, 
Belton, and Thornton, as articulated above, which need not be repeated, but is 
incorporated herein by reference. 
The overly broad interpretation of Belton, relied on by the State to justify the 
search of Mr. Cantrell, who was arrested on a warrant for failure to appear, and his 
vehicle searched while he was handcuffed in the back of the patrol cruiser, is far from a 
"long standing and widespread practice" by a "near-unanimous body of lower court 
authority." Rather, there has been tremendous dispute as to the permissible application 
of the Belton rule throughout the states and even in the circuit courts. In Idaho, the first 
case to adopt what it believed to be the Belton rule under Art. I, § 17 of the ldaho 
Constitution (the rule the Gant Court criticized as being an overly broad application of 
Belton) was State v. Charpentier, 131 ldaho 349, 962 P.2d 1033 (1998).1° In 
Charpentier, Ms. Charpentier was stopped and arrested for driving on a suspended 
license. Id. 131 ldaho at 650-651, 962 P.2d at 1034-1035. While Charpentier was 
handcuffed and in the back of the patrol cruiser, the officer searched her vehicle, 
ultimately locating controlled substances. Id. at 651, 962 P.2d 1035. 
In a 3-2 decision, this Court stated that the Belton rule that "a police officer may 
search the passenger compartment of an automobile as a contemporaneous incident of 
the arrest, even if the occupant has been removed from the automobile," "is the proper 
interpretation of what protections are provided by Article 1, $17 of the ldaho 
Constitution." Charpentier, 131 ldaho at 652, 962 P.2d at 1036. The dissent, however, 
would have suppressed the fruits of the search because they were not 
"instrumentalities" of the arrest, which of course was one of the permissible reasons for 
a search articulated in Gantand addressed in Thornton. Id. at 655, 962 P.2d at 1039. 
In fact, at the time of Gant, there were at least 12 states that had rejected a 
broad application of the Belton rule either under a restricted but proper reading of Belton 
or under a state statutory or constitutional analysis. See Arizona v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640 
(Ariz. 2007); State v. Bauder, 924 A.2d 38, 46 (Vt. 2007); State v. Valdez, 152 P.3d 
' O  In State V. Wafts, 142 ldaho 230, 127 P.3d 133 (2005) the ldaho Supreme Court 
refused to adopt Justice Scalia's concurrence in Thornton as the proper interpretation of 
Belton under the ldaho Constitution. 
1048, 1051 (Wash Ct. App. 2007); Camacho v. State, 75 P.3d 370, 373-374 (Nev. 
2003); Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 489 (Wyo. 1999); State v. Arredondo, 944 P.2d 
276, 284 (N.M. 1997); Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896, 902 (Pa. 1995); Ferrell v. 
State, 649 So.2d 831, 833 (Miss. 1995); Sfafe v. Pierce, 642 A.2d 947, 959 (N.J. 1994); 
People v. Torres, 543 N.E.2d 61, 63-64 (N.Y. 1989); Sfate v. Fesler, 685 P.2d 1014, 
1016-101 7 (Or. App. 1984); Commonwealth v. Toole, 448 N.E.2d 1264, 1266-1267 
(Mass. 1983); Sfafe v. Hernandez, 410 So.2d 1381, 1385 (La. 1982). Moreover, as the 
Ganf Court recognized, courts have been at odds "regarding how close in time to the 
arrest and how proximate to the arrestee's vehicle an officer's first contact with the 
arrestee must be to bring the encounter within" Belton. See Ganf, 129 S.Ct. at 1720, 
fn.6. 
Thus, given the various views throughout the states, the State's broad application 
of Belton is far from a "long standing and widespread practice" by a "near-unanimous 
body of lower court authority." Rather, the decision to search incident to arrest was an 
extremely varied and widely conflicted practice depending on where the arrest and 
subsequent constitutional violation occurred. 
2. Suppression Of The Fruits Of The Search In The Instant Case Is 
Necessaw To Enforce The Deterrent Effect Of The Exclusionarv Rule 
In Leon, the Supreme Court recognized that the exclusionary rule "operates as a 
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally 
through its deterrent effect." Id. 468 U.S. at 906 (internal citations omitted). The Court 
in Leon opined that because the officer was executing a facially valid warrant, issued by 
a judge with insufficient probable cause, the deterrent effect on police officers of 
applying the exclusionary rule would be minimal. Id. at 918-922. It has long been 
recognized that the preferred route prior to a search is for an officer to obtain a warrant 
as "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge 
or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a 
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 357 (1967). In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has "expressed a strong 
preference for warrants and declared that 'in a doubtful or marginal case a search under 
the warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fall."' Leon, 468 U.S. at 914 
(quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965)). 
As is articulated above, in reading Chimel, Belton, and Thornfon together, it was 
far from settled law that an officer could search a vehicle incident to arrest where the 
occupant was secured, and it was not objectively reasonable to believe the vehicle 
contained evidence of the offense of arrest. However, in Idaho, officers are apparently 
taught that they are "entitled" to search every vehicle, incident to the occupant's arrest, 
despite any evidence the vehicle would contain contraband relevant to the offense of 
arrest or that it would be impossible for the occupant to access the passenger 
compartment unless he "possessed the skill of Houdini and the strength of Hercules." 
Thornton, 541 U.S. at 626 (quoting United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666, 673 (5th Cir. 
1973) (Judge Goldberg concurring in part, dissenting in part)). It is in these gray areas 
where officers should be seeking warrants, rather than violating the security of 
"[c]ountless individuals guilty of nothing more serious than a traffic violation . . . ." Gant, 
129 S.Ct. at 1722-1723. Otherwise, "in close cases, law enforcement officials would 
have little incentive to err on the side of constitutional behavior." Johnson, 457 U.S. at 
560. Failing to apply the exclusionary rule to this Fourth Amendment violation "would 
'encourage police and other courts to disregard the plain purport of our decisions and to 
adopt a lets-wait-until-its-decided approach." Id. (citing Desist, 394 U.S. at 277). 
Accordingly, for these reasons it is imperative for this Court to reverse the district 
court's denial of Mr. Cantrell's suppression motion and apply the exclusionary rule to the 
State's Fourth Amendment violation. 
G. This Court Should Abide Bv The Rule Of Stare Decisis And Reaffirm State v. 
Guzman, Because It's Holdina Is Consistent With The Oriqinal Intent Of The 
Framers Of The ldaho Constitution And Furthers Important Goals Of The 
Exclusionarv Rule 
The State argues that State v. Guzman, 122 ldaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992) 
should be overruled and that ldaho should adopt the good faith doctrine. (Respondent's 
Brief, pp.12-18.) The State's argument is without merit. 
In 1992, the ldaho Supreme Court held that: 
we finally and unequivocally no longer adhere to a policy of sheepishly 
following in the footsteps of the U.S. Supreme Court in the area of state 
constitutional analysis. Based on our independent analysis of the merits 
of the good faith exception, as viewed in light of long-standing provisions 
of our ldaho Constitution, we are convinced that it is ill-conceived and 
cannot be reconciled with art. 1, § 17 of our state constitution. Accordingly, 
we conclude that the citizenry of ldaho will be better served if it no longer 
controls. We so hold. 
Guzman, 122 ldaho at 998,842 P.2d at 677 
Despite this clear holding, the State asks that the good faith exception be applied 
to the case at bar. (Respondent's Brief, pp.12-18.) However, Guzman should not be 
overruled as the rule of stare decisis supports its retention, and the holding in Guzman 
is consistent with the original intent of the framers of the ldaho Constitution and furthers 
important goals of the exclusionary rule. 
The ldaho Supreme Court has stated that "the rule of stare decisis dictates that 
we follow [controlling precedent], unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over 
time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, 
obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice." Reyes v. Kit Manufacturing 
Co., 131 ldaho 239, 953 P.2d 989 (1998) (quoting Houghland Farms, lnc. v. Johnson, 
119 ldaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990); State v. Al-Kotrani, 141 ldaho 66, 70, 106 
P.3d 392, 396 (2005) (declining to overrule State v. Green, 130 ldaho 503, 943 P.2d 
929 (1997)). And, of course, precisely when such conditions exist is often a subject of 
debate. See, e.g., Cutsinger v. Spears Mfg. Co., Inc., 137 Idaho 464, 50 P.3d 479 
(2002) (Kidwell, J., dissenting); State v. Maidwell, 137 ldaho 424, 50 P.3d 439 (2002) 
(Trout, C.J., dissenting) 
In State v. Donato, 135 ldaho 469, 20 P.3d 5 (2001), the ldaho Supreme Court 
reiterated that, "State Courts are at liberty to find within the provisions of their 
constitutions greater protection than is afforded under the federal constitution as 
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court," as that court "establishes no more 
than a floor of constitutional protection[.]" Id. at 471, 20 P.3d at 7 (citations omitted). In 
concluding that the ldaho Constitution did not offer greater protection than the federal 
constitution regarding warrantless garbage searches, the Donato Court recognized that: 
ldaho has clearly developed an exclusionary rule as a constitutionally 
mandated remedy for illegal searches and seizures in addition to other 
purposes behind the rule such as recognizing the exclusionary rule as a 
deterrent for police misconduct .... When the U.S. Supreme Court in Leon 
abandoned the original purposes of the exclusionary rule as adopted by 
Idaho, and focused the rule solely as a deterrent to illegal police behavior 
this Court did not follow.. . . The holding in Guzman was based on long- 
standing jurisprudence regarding the ldaho Constitution. 
Id. at 472, 20 P.3d at 8 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Guzman was correctly decided both as a matter of original intent and modern 
constitutional interpretation and cannot be overruled on the basis of manifest error, 
injustice, lack of wisdom, the vindication of obvious principles of law or the avoidance of 
manifest injustice. Accordingly, this Court should abide by the rule of stare decisis and 
reaffirm Guzman. 
1. Under An Oriainal Intent Analvsis, It Is Clear That The Drafters Of 
Article I, 5 17 Did Not Intend For There To Be A Good-Faith Exception To 
The Exclusionan/ Rule 
Broadly speaking, constitutional analysis has been divided between those jurists 
who see the Constitution as a document which needs to be interpreted in light of 
changing times and social conditions (the "dynamic" model), and those who believe the 
document means what the framer's intended at the time of the adoption (the "original 
intent" or "static" model). See and compare for example, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304 (2002) (Stevens, J., applying the "evolving standards of decency" test to Eighth 
Amendment claim and Scalia, J. dissenting because the claim that executing the 
mentally retarded is cruel and unusual "find[s] no support in the text or history of the 
Eighth Amendment."). In this case, however, the State cannot justify its request to 
overrule State v. Guzman, supra, under either the dynamic or static model of 
constitutional interpretation. 
First, the State's position finds no support from the original intent of the framers. 
Article I, § 17 of our constitution states that the right of the people "to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall 
not be violated; and no warrant shall issue without probable cause shown by affidavit . . 
." As has been noted before, the quoted text is nearly the same as the language of the 
Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., State v. Donato, 135 ldaho 469, 471, 20 P.3d 5, 7 
(2001). Indeed, it can be logically presumed that the framers of the State Constitution 
(many of whom were lawyersll) were aware of this similarity. And, as the State 
Constitution was adopted in 1889 and approved by Congress the next year (Act of 
July 3, 1890, ch.656, 26 Stat. 215) it can be further presumed that the original intent of 
the framers was to adopt the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as it existed in 
1889. Thus, if this Court seeks the original intent of the framers of the State 
Constitution, it should look to what the Fourth Amendment meant in 1889. 
This Court's early cases looked to the origins of the State Constitutional 
provisions and to the then-existing judicial interpretation of those provisions in order to 
discern the meaning of our own Constitution. Two examples illustrate this Court's 
method. 
First, just five years after the constitutional convention, this Court was called on 
to determine the scope of its writ power under Article V, § 912 in Stein v. Morrison, 9 
ldaho 426, 75 P. 246, 256-57 (1904). There, the Court looked to the section of the 
California constitution that served as the model for our provision and determined that 
this Court's power was coextensive with that of the California court's at the time of the 
adoption of our constitution, as that must have been the framer's intent: 
When a statutory or constitutional provision is adopted from another state, 
where the courts of that state have placed a construction upon the 
" Of the seventy-two delegates, twenty-five were admitted to practice before this Court. 
Five other delegates had practiced law in other jurisdictions or had trained as lawyers. 
Colson, D., "Idaho's Constitution: The tie that binds," Chap. 1, pg. 20, n.34 & 35 (1991) 
hereinafter, "Colson."). I2 That provision states: "The Supreme Court shall also have original jurisdiction to 
issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, and all writs necessary 
or proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction." 
language of such statute or constitution, it is to be presumed that it was 
taken in view of such judicial interpretation, and with the purpose of 
adopting the language as the same had been interpreted and construed 
by the courts of the state from which it was taken. 
Seven years later, this Court reiterated this presumption, writing that: 
[tlhe courts of this state would be most strongly inclined to follow the 
interpretation placed upon the like constitutional provision by the California 
court prior to our adoption of the same. This construction appeals to us as 
being reasonable and just, and fairly within the contemplation of the 
framers of the Constitution. 
Exparfe Schriber, 19 ldaho 531, 532 114 P. 29, 30 (1911). In Schriber, the Court held 
that Article I, § 6 (the constitutional provisions relating to bail, excessive fines and cruel 
and unusual punishment) to be coextensive with California's provision, as interpreted in 
1889. Id. 19 ldaho 531-532, 114 P. 29-30. This case also demonstrates that the 
provisions of Article I (Idaho's "Declaration of Rights") should be understood to have 
incorporated the then existing case law construing the analogous state or federal 
provision. 
What then of Article I, § 17, which was modeled after the Fourth Amendment? 
While there was a federal exclusionary rule in 1889, there was no good-faith exception 
to the rule. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). That constitutional innovation 
did not appear for another 98 years. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
In Boyd, the district attorney of New York filed a forfeiture action under federal 
custom laws alleging that a shipping company defrauded the government out of custom 
tariffs by misrepresenting the contents of a shipment. Id. 116 U.S. at 617. Prior to the 
trial, the district attorney applied for an order, authorized by the customs code, requiring 
the shipping company to turn over the shipping invoice and the trial court granted the 
order. Id. at 618. The company complied with the order under protest and was 
convicted after the evidence obtained via the order was introduced at trial. Id. 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction because the evidence 
was obtained in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments 
We think that the notice to produce the invoice in this case, the order by 
virtue of which it was issued, and the law which authorized the order, were 
unconstitutional and void, and that the inspection by the district attorney of 
said invoice, when produced in obedience to said notice, and its 
admission in evidence by the court, were erroneous and unconstitutional 
proceedings. 
116 U.S. at 638. 
There is nothing in the Boyd Opinion to suggest that the district attorney was not 
acting in good-faith reliance upon a (presumably valid) Congressional enactment and a 
(facially valid) order of a federal district court when obtaining the evidence. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court applied the exclusionary rule. In light of that holding, 
it must be concluded that the United States Supreme Court and, by extension, the 
framers of Article I, 5 17 intended that the exclusionary rule provide a remedy to 
unreasonable searches and seizures and further that the remedy should apply to 
violations irrespective of any "good-faith" of the government agents. 
In sum, under an "original intent" analysis, the State's request to overrule 
Guzman should be rejected because the framers of the State Constitution never 
intended such an interpretation of Article I, 5 17. The same result obtains when using 
the dynamic model of c'onstitutional analysis, 
2. There is No Reauirement That This Court Adopt, Under Article 1. 5 17, 
Every Interpretation Of The Fourth Amendment Adopted Bv The United 
States Supreme Court 
This Court has not, at least in modern times, looked to the framer's original 
intent. Instead, it has evaluated the reasons and merits of the particular federal 
constitutional rule before deciding whether to adopt it under the state constitution. In 
this same vein, it has stated that it is "at liberty" to find within the provisions of the state 
constitution "greater protections than is afforded under the federal constitution as 
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court." State v. Donato, 135 ldaho at 471,20 
P.3d at 7 (2001) (citing Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); see also, Donato, 
135 ldaho at 474, 20 P.2d at 10 (Schroeder, J., specially concurring "in the reasoning" 
of the Court's opinion)). 
This independent analysis is not only a recognition of the sovereignty of Idaho, it 
also serves to protect Idaho's citizens when the United States Supreme Court is simply 
incorrect about what is "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. For example, at the 
time of Gant, Belton had been rejected by 12 different states. See Section (1)(6)(2)(b). 
Finally, it recognizes that the United States Supreme Court rarely speaks with a 
single voice on controversial constitutional issues and the correct answer for ldaho 
might be found in a dissenting opinion, instead of in the majority view. 
3. The Good-faith Exception Is Inconsistent With This Court's Decision In 
State v. Arreaui, 44 ldaho 43,254 P. 788 (19271 
The exclusionary rule was expressly adopted under Article 1, § 17 in State v. 
Arregui, 44 ldaho 43, 254 P. 788 (1927). There, the Court noted the overruling of 
Sfate v. Anderson, 31 ldaho 514, 174 P. 124 (1918), by State v. Myers, 36 ldaho 396, 
211 P.440 (1922). Anderson had held that "[elvidence otherwise competent and 
relevant to the issue is not rendered inadmissible by reason of it having been disclosed 
by an unlawful search or obtained by an unlawful seizure." Anderson, 31 Idaho at 515, 
174 P. 125. In doing so, the Anderson Court relied upon the treatise Greenleaf on 
Evidence as well as state and foreign cases, but did not look to the United States 
Supreme Court interpretation of the Fourth Amendment as of 1889. This omission by 
the Court was noted in dissent by Justice Morgan, 
These sections [the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and 
the right against self-incrimination] had, more than five years prior to the 
adoption of our Constitution, been construed by the United States 
Supreme Court, in the case of Boyd v. United States, I16 U.S. 616, 6 
Sup. Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed.746, and we are deemed to have adopted them in 
view of the interpretation placed upon them by that court and with the 
intention that they receive a like construction. 
Id. at -, 174 P. at 128 
Justice Morgan's statements about the original intent of the framers are 
compelling as he was a delegate at the constitutional convention and a member of both 
the Preamble and Bill of Rights Committee and the Judiciary Committee. See, Colson, 
p.236. Neither member of the Anderson majority (Justices Rice and Budge) was 
present at the drafting of the state constitution. id. 
Justice Morgan's view prevailed shortly thereafter in Myers, supra, where a 
majority of the Court stated in a special concurrence that it approved of the federal 
exclusionary rule as stated in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1915). Weeks, in 
turn, cited to and relied upon the 1886 case of Boyd v. United States, supra. 
The Arregui Court looked at the Anderson case and disagreed with or 
distinguished the cases relied upon by the Anderson Court. In particular it noted that 
many of the out-of-state cases cited in Anderson were no longer followed by that state. 
Arregui, 44 ldaho a t ,  254 P. at 796. The Court then independently evaluated the 
merits of the exclusionary rule and adopted it under the state constitution stating that it 
would not do so merely because the United States Supreme Court has adopted it, 
although it would give the opinions of that Court due consideration. Id. There is nothing 
in Arregui to suggest that this Court was adopting a view of Article I, § 17 which would 
change whenever the federal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment changes. 
The Arregui Court adopted the federal exclusionary rule as it existed in 1886 
when Boyd was decided, not as a moving target which would change (without input 
from ldaho as no Idahoan has ever been appointed to the United States Supreme 
Court) turning on five votes of the current members of the Court. And as there was no 
hint in Boyd that the government was acting in anything less that total good-faith it 
cannot be concluded that the Arregui Court intended to carve out a good-faith exception 
to the exclusionary rule. 
Further, we know that the Arregui Court did not feel that it was required to follow 
Fourth Amendment law. The Fourth Amendment did not apply to the states in 1927, as 
was stated in Weeks itself. Thus, this Court knew it could, but was not required, to 
adopt the Weeks rule under the ldaho Constitution. In fact, the Fourth Amendment 
would not be incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment until Wolff v. Colorado, 338 
U.S. 25 (1949) and the exclusionary rule would not be so incorporated until Mapp v. 
Ohio, 342 U.S. 117 (1951). Arregui adopted the then-existing exclusionary rule in its 
authority as the highest court for an independent sovereign, not because it was required 
to walk in lockstep with the federal g~vernment.'~ 
In its briefing, the State argues that the only goal of the federal exclusionary rule 
is the deterrence of police misconduct. (Respondent's Brief, p.18.) While deterrence of 
law enforcement officers is one purpose, it is also "fair to say that the deterrence of 
unreasonable searches and seizures is a major purpose of the [Boyd and Weeks] 
exclusionary rule." 1 LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth 
Amendment (3rd Ed.) 5 l . l ( f )  (1996). Deterrence of constitutional violations in general 
is a much broader proposition than deterrence of police misconduct because it includes 
mistakes made by the Judiciary and Legislature. 
This broader deterrent effect was adopted in Boyd. In that case, it was a 
presumably valid court order based upon a presumptively valid Congressional 
enactment by which the government obtained the evidence. Nevertheless, the United 
States Supreme Court found suppression the correct remedy. Thus, the deterrent effect 
of Idaho's exclusionary rule is aimed at reducing all error regardless of whether the error 
is made by the judicial, legislative or executive branch. This makes sense because, so 
far as the victim of the unconstitutional search is concerned. it makes no difference 
l3 The Delaware Court recently expressed this same thought. 
Although Delaware is bound together with the forty-nine other States in an 
indivisible federal union, it remains a sovereign State, governed by its own 
laws and shaped by its own unique heritage. An examination of those laws 
and that heritage may, from time to time, lead to the conclusion that 
Delaware's citizens enjoy more rights, more constitutional protections, 
than the Federal Constitution extends to them. If we were to hold that our 
Constitution is simply a mirror image of the Federal Constitution, we would 
be relinquishing an important incident of this State's sovereignty. In a very 
real sense, Delaware would become less of a State than its sister States 
who recognize the independent significance of their Constitutions. 
whether the police have decided to search without a warrant, or a judicial officer has 
decided to issue one without probable cause, or the legislature has passed an 
unconstitutional law permitting the search. in all these cases, the constitutional violation 
has the same effect on the individual whose rights have been violated. 
Professor LaFave goes on to note that: 
[Wlhile it may be fair to say that deterrence is the "major thrust" of the 
exclusionary rule, the rule does serve other purposes as well. There is, 
for example, what the Elkins ~ o u r t ' ~  referred to as the "the imperative of 
judicial integrity," namely that the courts not become "accomplices in the 
willful disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold." 
A third purpose of the exclusionary rule . . . is that "of assuring the people- 
all potential victims of unlawful government conduct-that the government 
would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of 
seriously undermining popular trust in government." While at first blush 
this may appear to be merely a statement of the deterrent function, this is 
not the case, for the focus is on the effect of exclusion upon the public 
rather than the police. 
Support for this third purpose of the exclusionary rule is found in Weeks itself as 
well as being one of the reasons set forth in State v. Arregui. 
A continued disregard for the rights guaranteed under the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments, and the principles thereof incorporated in state 
Constitutions, heads us directly to revolution against their usurpation, if 
history tells us correctly that violation of the rights sought to be protected 
thereby was one of the chief moving reasons for the Revolution. 
Id. at -, 254 P. at 792. 
Thus, the State's argument, i.e., that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule should be adopted because suppression of evidence obtained by the police in 
Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 814-815 (Del. 2000). 
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good-faith reliance on what it believed to be the law at the time of the search does not 
further the purposes of the ldaho exclusionary rule, is demonstratively false. The rule 
furthers the goal of judicial integrity, in that the courts do not participate in what amounts 
to a second violation of the individual rights by admitting the illegally seized items into 
evidence. And, it furthers the goal of public trust in governmental institutions by not 
permitting the government to profit from its own wrong doings. These goals of the 
Arregui Court are all furthered by the current exclusionary rule and undermined by 
Leon. 
4. State v. Guzman Was Correctly Decided 
It is because of the Guzman court's proper view of the purposes of the 
exclusionary rule, that it was correctly decided. It also correctly noted that it was the 
United States Supreme Court which had gone away from the original purposes of the 
exclusionary rule in a series of cases starting with Unifed States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 
338 (1974), by focusing too narrowly on the police deterrent rationale. Guzman, 122 
ldaho at 992, 842 P.2d at 671. Leon, of course, was the eventual result of this too 
narrow focus. This Court noted, however, there were five purposes15 to the ldaho 
l4 Elkins v. United Stafes, 364 U.S. 206 (1 960). 
l5 The fifth goal of the exclusionary rule indicates that it is necessary "to provide an 
effective remedy to persons who have been subjected to an unreasonable government 
search andlor seizure," is especially important in light of another judicially created 
limitation on remedies for Fourth Amendment violations: the qualified immunity defense 
that law enforcement personnel have in civil rights claims brought under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. A person who has been a victim of a Fourth Amendment violation may 
not recover against the police officers committing the violation in a civil rights action 
unless the Fourth Amendment law was "clearly established" at the time of the violation 
and the officers considering the facts and circumstances acted "unreasonably" when 
they violated that clearly established law. See, e.g., Hunfer v. Bryanf, 502 U.S. 224, 
227 (1991); Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1993). The 
combination of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule and the qualified 
exclusionary rule and that four of the five reasons still applied even in the case of true 
good-faith reliance by the police on a facially valid judicially issued warrant. Id. at 993. 
Idaho is by no means alone in its views. As noted above a number of other 
states had had rejected the good-faith exception under their respective state 
constitutions or on statutory grounds. See Stafe v. Bauder, 924 A.2d 38, 46 (Vt. 2007); 
State v. Valdez, 152 P.3d 1048, 1051 (Wash Ct. App. 2007); Camacho v. Stafe, 75 P.3d 
370, 373-374 (Nev. 2003); Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 489 (Wyo. 1999); State v. 
Arredondo, 944 P.2d 276, 284 (N.M. 1997); Commonwealfh v. White, 669 A.2d 896, 
902 (Pa. 1995); FerreN v. Stafe, 649 So.2d 831, 833 (Miss. 1995); State v. Pierce, 642 
A.2d 947, 959 (N.J. 1994); People v. Torres, 543 N.E.2d 61, 63-64 (N.Y. 1989); State v. 
Fesler, 685 P.2d 1014, 1016-1017 (Or. App. 1984); Commonwealfh v. Tooie, 448 
N.E.2d 1264, 1266-1267 (Mass. 1983); State v. Hernandez, 410 So.2d 1381, 1385 (La. 
1982); People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 488 N.E.2d 451 (1985); 
People v. Bennett, 653 N.Y.S.2d 835 (N.Y. Sup. 1996); State v. Crawley, 808 P.2d 773 
(Wash. App. 1991); Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 426 (Ga. 1992); Imo v. State, 826 S.W.2d 
714 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992). 
Since Guzman was decided, three other state courts have followed this Court's 
lead. Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807 (Del. 2000); State v. Canelo, 653 A.2d 1097 (N.H. 
1995); State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277 (lowa 2000) (overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 (lowa 2001)). 
immunity defense to a civil rights action, leaves some defendants who have had their 
Fourth Amendment rights violated by the illegal police conduct with no remedy at all. 
This is a result properly avoided by the Arregui exclusionary rule. 
The Cline Court rejected the Leon reasoning as follows: 
Although more recent Supreme Court decisions, as represented by 
Leon, have narrowed the focus of the exclusionary rule to the deterrence 
of constitutional violations by law enforcement, the rule was originally 
justified for the additional reasons that it provided a remedy for the 
constitutional violation and protected judicial integrity. See Mapp, 367 U.S. 
at 656-57, 659, 81 S.Ct. at 1692, 1694, 6 L.Ed.2d at 1090-92. Regardless 
of whether one believes that the post-Mapp cases have revised the history 
of the exclusionary rule or merely refined the rule, we think the rule serves 
a purpose greater than simply deterring police misconduct. Clearly our 
early cases viewed the exclusionary rule as a remedy for the constitutional 
violation and relevant to the integrity of the courts. 
It is true, as the Supreme Court has noted, that suppression of the 
evidence does not "cure" the constitutional invasion, see Leon, 468 U.S. 
at 906, 104 S.Ct. at 3412, 82 L.Ed.2d at 687, but it is clearly the best 
remedy available. As with many civil remedies, the exclusionary rule 
merely places the parties in the positions they would have been in had the 
unconstitutional search not occurred, and the State is deprived only of that 
to which it was not entitled in the first place. 
As this court has stated, the exclusionary rule also protects the integrity of 
the courts. The reasoning that leads to this conclusion is obvious. By 
admitting evidence obtained illegally, courts would in essence condone 
the illegality by stating it does not matter how the evidence was secured. 
Even if we were to accept the [United States Supreme] Court's proposition 
that the exclusionary rule is aimed solely at deterrence, we cannot accept 
the Court's limitation on the deterrence function to law enforcement. 
Common sense tells us that the exclusionary rule prompts more care and 
attention at all stages of the warrant-issuing process, including by the 
judicial officers issuing the warrant. The same can be said for legislative 
action. The knowledge that an unconstitutional statute will be of no 
assistance to law enforcement will certainly tend to encourage lawmakers 
to take care to ensure that any law they enact passes constitutional 
muster. Thus, the exclusionary rule serves a deterrent function even 
when the police officers act in good faith. Consequently, to adopt a good 
faith exception would only encourage lax practices by government officials 
in all three branches of government. 
617 N.W.2d 289-290 (citations omitted and emphasis added). 
In conclusion, this Court should decline the State's invitation to overrule State v. 
Guzman. The State has not shown that Guzman is manifestly in error, unjust, lacking in 
wisdom, or that it must be overruled in order to vindicate obvious principles of law or to 
avoid manifest injustice. To the contrary, as shown above, Guzman is soundly 
reasoned from both historical and modern viewpoints and it furthers justice by deterring 
future constitutional violations and by providing an effective remedy when they do occur. 
H. Suppression Of The Evidence In This Case Serves The Purposes Of Idaho's 
Exclusionarv Rule 
In Guzman, the Court reiterated the rationale under Idaho's exclusionary rule 
necessary to: 
1. Provide an effective remedy to persons who have been subjected to an 
unreasonable government search andlor seizure; 
2. Deter the police from acting unlawfully in obtaining evidence; 
3. Encourage thoroughness in the warrant issuing process; 
4. Avoid having the judiciary commit an additional constitutional violation 
by considering evidence which has been obtained through illegal 
means; and 
5. Preserve judicial integrity. 
Guzman, 122 Idaho at 993,842 P.2d at 672. 
First, as is addressed in detail above, suppression of the evidence in this case is 
potentially the only remedy available to Mr. Cantrell, where it is entirely possible he 
would not succeed in a civil law suit. See Footnote 15. Moreover, the State's position 
that Officer White's conduct was "legal and reasonable" at the time of the search 
ignores the language of the Gant Opinion criticizing our court's overly broad reading of 
Belfon in light of Chime1 and Thornton. Second, as set forth in section I(F)(2), applying 
the exclusionary rule will satisfy and reinforce its intended deterrent effect. Third, 
exclusion of the illegally obtained evidence will encourage officers not to take a wait- 
and-see approach when it comes to questionable police actions and those officers will 
be more likely to "err on the side of constitutional behavior" and seek the issuance of a 
warrant prior to conducting the search. Johnson, 457 U.S. at 560. Fourth, as is with the 
clear import of the exclusionary rule, this Court would compound Mr. Cantrell's 
constitutional violation by permitting its use against him, thereby rewarding Officer White 
for failing to seek to obtain a warrant. Finally, judicial integrity will be sewed as it cannot 
be argued that the officer responsible for the search in Gant was also relying on this 
same broad reading of Belfon, yet the United States Supreme Court did not deem it 
appropriate to ignore the constitutional violation or refuse to suppress the fruits of its 
trespass because the officer made a mistake of law. See Ganf, 129 S.Ct. at 1722-1723. 
Thus, Mr. Cantrell would be treated the same as a similarly situated Gant was treated. 
Accordingly, the goals of Idaho's exclusionary rule would be served by 
suppressing the illegally obtained evidence in the instant case. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Cantrell respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
denying his suppression motion and enter an order suppressing all of the evidence 
derived from the State's illegal search of his vehicle. 
DATED this lSt day of October, 2009. 
Deputy State ~ p p e h a k  public Defender 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this lst day of October, 2009, 1 served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be placed a 
copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
DEBORAH A BAIL 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
E-MAILED COPY OF BRIEF 
ROBYN FYFFE 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
303 WEST BANNOCK STREET 
PO BOX 2772 
BOISE ID 83701 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0010 
Hand deliver to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court 
EVAN A. SMITH 
Administrative Assistant 

